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Abstract 
We examine the impact of the financial crisis on the stock market valuation of large and 
systemic U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs).  Using the Bertsatos and Sakellaris (2016) 
model of fundamental valuation of bank equity, we provide evidence that the financial crisis 
has not altered investors’ attitudes towards bank characteristics.  In particular, before, during, 
and after the crisis, investors in large and systemic U.S. BHCs seemed to penalize leverage, 
albeit temporarily.  Both before and after the crisis, they reward size in the short run.  This 
pattern is appearing only briefly during the crisis.  We also show that bank opacity plays no 
role in market valuation either in the short run or in the long run.  Last but not least, we find 
evidence that stress testing has been informative to the market and that those BHCs that 
failed at the post-crisis stress tests were not subsequently valued differently by the market. 
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     The valuation by market participants of U.S. bank holding companies’ (BHCs) stock has 
fluctuated considerably over the decade of 2004 to 2014.  As regards the price-to-book ratio 
of equity (PB), we have also observed large, secular declines during and after the financial 
crisis that erupted in 2007.  Calomiris and Nissim (2014) document this secular decline for 
the universe of U.S. BHCs and explain it in terms of declines in the values of intangibles 
along with unrecognized contingent obligations.  The declines in market valuation have been 
particularly sharp for the group of very large and systemic U.S. BHCs - a group that has 
received substantial scrutiny by the market.  These are the BHCs that participated in a series 
of capital assessment exercises and stress tests conducted by U.S. federal regulators starting 
in 2009 and include eight Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs). 
     Given the unprecedented scrutiny that these BHCs have been subjected to, we ask whether 
this has altered the way in which investors value these BHCs and at the same time whether 
stress testing has been informative to the market.  Previewing our results, the answer is: not 
significantly so.  To be clear, we do not explore explanations of the secular decline in the PB 
ratios of bank equity, a matter that has been addressed convincingly by Calomiris and Nissim 
(2014).  These changes in market PB ratios are best thought of as reflecting broadly 
corresponding changes in equilibrium valuations.  Instead, we investigate to what extent 
short-run deviations between market PB ratios and their fundamental values have changed in 
nature after the financial crisis and the imposition of the new regulatory requirements.  
Instead of the cross-sectional variation of PB ratios, we focus on the time-series cross-
sectional variation of PB ratios with co-integrating techniques.  Another feature that 
differentiates our work from Calomiris and Nissim (2014) is that we concentrate only on the 
3 
 
group of the largest U.S. BHCs.4  We contrast market movements in BHCs’ PB ratios to 
those derived from the Dynamic Dividend Discount Model (3DM), a model of fundamental 
valuation developed by Bertsatos and Sakellaris (2016), and analyze divergences between 
these two valuations.  3DM has attractive features: it establishes an equilibrium relationship 
among the PB ratio of equity and measures of fundamentals such as the cost of equity, the 
expected growth of net income (NI) and modified dividend payout ratio (DPR), and allows 
for temporary deviations from that relationship. 
     Our empirical work proceeds in two steps.  First, we establish that for large and systemic 
U.S. BHCs there is an economically meaningful and stable long-run equilibrium relationship 
between the PB ratio of equity and the aforementioned fundamental variables.  Second, we 
examine whether any short-run divergences of market valuation from this equilibrium 
relationship are related systematically to observable bank characteristics such as leverage, 
opacity and size.  A striking result that we obtain is that, at any given point in time, there is a 
large heterogeneity in the degree to which PB ratios of these BHCs are temporarily above or 
below their long-run equilibrium valuation.  Furthermore, these divergences are rather 
persistent over time.  On average, less than three tenths of the gap closes each quarter.  We 
show that divergences from fundamental valuation in PB ratios are created as the market, in 
general, under-reacts in the short run to changes in fundamentals.  The degree of divergence 
depends on bank characteristics such as leverage and size but not on opacity.  In the long run, 
we show that the estimates of fundamental PB ratios given by 3DM have properly priced risk, 
growth and cash flows, as proxied by cost of equity, expected growth of net income and 
modified dividend payout ratio, respectively, throughout the period examined. 
                                                          
4
  The BHCs in our sample are substantially larger (minimum value of assets is 28.6 billion USD) than those 
classified as large BHCs in their sub-sample (minimum value is 2 billion USD). 
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     We find that short-run divergences between market and fundamental valuation are related 
systematically to observable bank characteristics such as leverage and size controlling for 
various macroeconomic variables.  In particular, the market tended to temporarily undervalue 
BHCs with higher leverage, relative to their fundamental valuation, throughout the period we 
are analyzing.  Size seems to have had a positive effect before and after the crisis.  In other 
words, larger BHCs displayed higher overvaluation relative to fundamentals, albeit 
temporarily so.  This effect temporarily disappeared during the crisis but returned after the 
crisis.  We also examine the role of bank opacity and find that it does not affect market 
participants’ valuations in the short run.5  On the whole, these results indicate that the recent 
financial crisis has not altered substantially the way that market participants value very large 
and systemic U.S. BHCs.  Moreover, we find evidence that either the GSIB status or the 
failure at the post-crisis stress-testing exercises (Comprehensive Capital Analysis Review, 
CCARs) have not affected market valuation of their PB ratios.  The only exception is the 
earlier stress test, i.e. the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), which seems to 
have had a negative effect on PB market valuation for the failed BHCs.  Last but not least, we 
find evidence that stress testing was informative to the market participants. 
     In the next section, we present the model of fundamental share valuation, and in section 
three we discuss our empirical analysis and findings.  Finally, in section four we offer some 
concluding remarks. 
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  There may be other reasons that market valuation of banks could show (persistent) divergences from 
fundamental valuation.  For example, emerging markets developments, exposure to certain commodities such as 
oil, fines and impending settlements, and most recently prospects of negative deposit interest rates.  
Incorporating these are out of the paper’s scope.  We thank an anonymous referee for this comment. 
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2. A Bank Valuation Model 
     We compute the fundamental values of the BHCs in our sample applying the 3DM of 
Bertsatos and Sakellaris (2016).  According to 3DM, there is an equilibrium relationship 
between the PB ratio and the cost of equity, expected growth of net income and modified 
dividend payout ratio. 
 
, ,NI DPRPB f r g
− + + =  
 
  (1) 
     This equilibrium relationship holds the same for all BHCs in the panel, and is 
approximated in estimation by a second-order Taylor expansion of ( ).f .  3DM then applies 
the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) method of Pesaran et al. (1999) that allows PB ratios to 
diverge from this equilibrium relationship temporarily.  The degree of persistence in such 
divergence is heterogeneous to each BHC in the panel. 
     Using the estimates of the long-run relationship (1), we calculate the predicted PB ratios.  
These are the PB values that would prevail under the estimated model if bank values were at 
long-run equilibrium. 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Data Description 
     The BHCs in our sample participated in the 2008 Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP), 
2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 
Comprehensive Capital Analysis Review (CCAR), and 2013 and 2014 Dodd-Frank Act 
Stress Tests (DFAST) exercises conducted by the Fed.  Data used is quarterly, from 2003:Q4 
to 2014:Q1, i.e. 42T = , and refers to values at the end of each quarter.  We collected data 
from Datastream mainly and secondarily from BHCs’ SEC filings (10-K and 10-Q) when this 
was necessary.  The aggregate number of BHCs that participated in the 2008 TARP, 2009 
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SCAP and the consecutive CCARs is 31.  Since six of them are either unlisted or subsidiaries 
of international holding companies and for one of them we have small number of 
observations, our sample is reduced to 24 BHCs. 
Data Construction: 
     We define PB ratio as the market value of equity over its book value at the end of each 
quarter.  There are two issues with this definition that we must address.  First, that valuation 
models reflect the price of a common share.  Therefore, all non-common equity should be 
excluded and only common equity should be used.  Second, that at each quarter’s end, 
investors do not know the true value of PB, because the quarter-end’s book value of common 
equity (BVCE) gets published one or two months later.  We assume that, in order to calculate 
PB at quarter-end, investors use in the denominator a forecast of this quarter-end BVCE. 
     The estimated PB ratio with the forecast of BVCE is constructed as follows: We make this 
forecast by multiplying the last quarter’s (known) BVCE with ( )1 g+ , where g is the average 
of the last five BVCE growth rates, i.e.: 
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 is the BVCE at the t-i quarter.  Furthermore, we calculate market value of 
common equity as the product of quarter-end’s close price and number of outstanding shares.  
The number of outstanding shares is adjusted for splits and reverse splits.   
     We construct COE, the cost of equity, assuming that CAPM holds, as the sum of the risk-
free rate and beta times equity risk premium (ERP): 
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 ( )i i iMf f fr r b E R r r b ERP  = + − = + ⋅  (3) 
where, ir  is the BHC-specific COE, fr  is the risk free rate, ib  is the BHC-specific beta 
coefficient and ( )ME R  is the expected market return.  We use ten-year Treasury bond yields 
as the risk-free rate.  These values, taken from the U.S. Treasury website, are month-end 
values.  Betas are calculated based on S&P500 total return index.6  We calculate each BHC’s 
returns from the return index prices.7  The source is Datastream and we use month-end 
observations.  Moreover, we use the last 60 monthly observations (each one at the end of the 
respective month).  We find ERP at Damodaran’s website (based on S&P500 at the end of 
each year as well), and because it is for the last quarter of each year, we adjust it for the other 
quarters as follows. After adding the year-end’s risk-free rate to the respective ERP, we get 
the expected market return for that year.  Furthermore, we assume that the expected market 
return is the same for all quarters of the year.  Finally, we subtract the corresponding end of 
quarter risk-free rate from the expected market return so as to get the desired ERP. 
     We prefer return on common equity (ROCE) to ROE for the calculation of expected 
growth, because valuation models refer to common shareholders.  Following the same logic, 











=  (4) 
     Finally, we calculate DPR, the dividend payout ratio, as the ratio of dividends to the 
BVCE.  However, for consistency in the model, we use dividends and NI to common 
shareholders, and BVCE.  Further adjustment is made for the amounts spent for share 
                                                          
6
  We use the market-value weighted S&P500 index. 
7
  See Datastream definitions for further details about return index prices. 
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repurchases, for which we assume that they are equally distributed across the quarters of a 
year (as stated in SEC 10-K filings).  Additionally, because it is the event of dividend 
declaration that affects the price of a common share rather than the event of dividend 
payment, we use dividends declared instead of dividends paid.  We find declaration dates at 












_Mod DPR  is the modified DPR and SR  is the annual amount spent for share 
repurchases.  For 2014:Q1, the last quarter in our sample, the amount spent for stock 
buybacks is taken from SEC 10-Q filings and is not divided by four, because it is a quarterly 
value already. 
     Substituting equations (4) and (5) into: 
 ( )_ _ 1 _Exp Growth NI Mod DPR ROCE= − ⋅   (6) 
we get the expected growth of NI or Exp_Growth. 
       Regarding the macro variables: We use an index that captures the market sentiment.  
This index is constructed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and captures a broad 
range of components indicating financial stress.  The St. Louis Financial Stress Index 
(STLFSI) includes seven interest rates, six yield spreads and five other indicators.  Negative 
values signify below-average financial market stress and positive values above-average 
financial market stress. 
3.2 Estimation 
     First, we estimate (1) in order to find the fundamental values of PB ratios.  We follow 
Pesaran et al. (1999) to determine the appropriate 
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estimation of 3DM and arrive at the following estimated restricted error-correction model 
(ECM) of equation (1): 
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where, PB is the market PB ratio, iφ  is the speed of adjustment, 0iα  is the bank-specific 
intercept, the remaining α’s are the common long-run coefficients, δ’s are the bank-specific 
short-run coefficients and itε  is the error term.  Inside the parentheses is the term (PBi,t-1 – 
FPBi,t), where FPB is the fundamental PB ratio estimated as the second-order Taylor 
expansion of equation (1), C is the cost of equity, E is the expected growth of net income, M 
is the modified dividend payout ratio, and the remaining variables are Taylor expansion terms 
that have been selected using the Schwarz (1978) Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC).8 
     By manipulating equation (7) in the long run, we arrive at: 
 ( )0 since 0, where  is equal to 1i i i iPB FPB PB FPBφ γ φ γ= − ⇒ = ⋅ <   (8) 
     So, our first task is to test the hypothesis H0: γ = 1 in the long run, while controlling for 
other bank characteristics and macroeconomic determinants. 
     In order to explore whether our estimates for the fundamental value of PB, i.e. FPB, 
capture significant part of the variation of market PB ratios, we extend (8) to the following 
panel data model: 
                                                          
8
  In calculating fundamental PB ratios, we kept only observations with positive values of predicted PB ratios.  
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where, Xj are time-varying bank characteristics, Wk are variables summarizing the financial 
market stress and εit is the idiosyncratic error term. 
     We first need to check the order of integration of the variables we are going to use, then 
test for evidence of co-integration and, finally, estimate equations (7) and (9). 
3.3 Estimating Fundamental Values 
     After estimating equation (7), we find that the average speed of adjustment, φ, is -28.8%, 
greater than -2, and statistically significant, which means that a stable long-run equilibrium 
relationship dictated by (1) exists.9  The speed of adjustment is not a pooled estimate but 
rather the average of the corresponding coefficients across cross sections.  The magnitude of 
φ implies that about 29% of any deviation from the long run value is eliminated in one 
quarter and that a year after a shock about 25.7% of any disequilibrium still remains.  After 
14 quarters, the PB ratio has closed 99.1% of the gap from long-run equilibrium valuation.  
This implies that PB values are away from steady-state equilibrium for extended periods of 
time. 
     Calculating the partial derivatives of the long-run relationship with respect to the cost of 
equity, expected growth of net income and modified dividend payout ratio, we find that the 
three aforementioned variables present the expected signs at the largest part of the 
distribution.  Therefore, 3DM is a valid stock market valuation model in our sample.10 
                                                          
9
  Results regarding the estimation of equation (7) are in the Online Appendix. 
10
  A Hausman (1978) test provides evidence that long-run slope homogeneity holds.  So, all BHCs in the panel 
seem to have the same long-run steady-state relation as assumed in 3DM. 
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3.4 Explaining Temporary Divergences of Market from Fundamental PB Ratios 
     We proceed to explaining divergences of market from fundamental PB ratios in terms of 
bank-specific variables, and an index capturing both financial and macroeconomic 
conditions.  The bank-specific variables are the leverage ratio (total assets over book value of 
common equity), bank size (log of assets) and bank opacity (details about opacity are in the 
next paragraph).  The aforementioned index is constructed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis and captures a broad range of components indicating financial stress.11 
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Notes: This is the St. Louis Financial Stress Index (STLFSI).  Before-crisis period is from 2003:Q4 to 2007:Q2, 
during-crisis period from 2007:Q3 to 2009:Q4 and after-crisis period from to 2010:Q1 to 2014:Q1. 
     As we see in Figure 1, this index tracks down the crisis regimes very well.  We believe 
that including the STLFSI variable in the right-hand side (RHS) of equation (9) controls quite 
well for aggregate financial market conditions. 
                                                          
11
  Some other papers, which also use financial stress indices are that of Hippler and Hassan (2015), and Vasicek 




     The concept of opacity in the banking industry is that investors cannot observe the risks 
taken in the process of intermediation and, hence, they cannot distinguish adequately between 
healthy and risky banks.  Opacity in the banking industry should be viewed as a hypothesis, 
rather than a fact.  Morgan (2002), Hirtle (2006), Iannotta (2006), Bannier et al. (2010), and 
Haggard and Howe (2012) provide evidence that banks are more opaque than are non-banks.  
Flannery et al. (2013) show that banks are more opaque than non-banks during crisis periods 
only.  This discussion points to the potential of exploring the role of opacity in valuation of 
the banks in our sample.  Following Haggard and Howe (2012), we use as a measure of 
opacity the coefficient of determination, R2, of market-model excess-return regressions that 
use 52 weekly observations.  In similar spirit, Jones et al. (2013) show that larger investments 
in opaque assets engender higher values for the logistic transform, which implies higher R2.  
Bai et al. (2017) employ the same logistic transformation to measure market synchronicity.  
Also, Hutton et al. (2009) show that increased values of their measure of earnings 
manipulation lead to lower idiosyncratic risk, which implies higher R2.  We use the four-
quarter moving average of R2 as our proxy of bank opacity, which we term OPACITY.12 
     How would a bank’s opacity affect its market PB ratio diverging temporarily from its 
long-run fundamental value?  Since investors are not able to measure accurately risks related 
to a bank that holds more opaque assets, this will negatively affect the demand of that stock.  
Alternatively, standard asset-pricing models predict that market participants unable to 
understand the nature of the assets in which they invest, would require a risk premium and 
hence, a discount on the asset price.  Consequently, the market undervalues that bank and its 
PB ratio is lower.  On the contrary, opaque assets may display overvaluation and thus, higher 
                                                          
12
  For robustness, we also use the R2 coefficient of the market-model regressions. 
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values for the PB ratios.  The inability of investors to assess the risks of that bank may 
positively affect the demand of that stock.  Thus, high level of opacity of a bank may be 
rewarded from market participants.  Therefore, demand increases and that bank stock is 
overvalued.  Thus, the sign of opacity is empirically ambiguous.  In this paper we explore 
whether opacity affects market value both in the long and in the short run. 
Size and Leverage 
     Calomiris and Nissim (2014) contain an excellent discussion of the relationship between 
market valuation of banks and their size or leverage.  The effect of size is expected to be 
positive for various reasons, a prominent one being implicit government subsidies.  The 
effect of leverage on temporary divergences of market from fundamental PB ratios is 
ambiguous.  On the one hand, lower leverage may be valued positively by the market as it 
provides a bank higher flexibility in operations and greater ability to grow by issuing debt 
without having to raise (relatively costly) external equity.  On the other hand, higher leverage 
may be valued positively as an indication of efficient management that has maximized net 
benefits of leverage by exploiting profitable opportunities.  Alternatively, leverage may be 
valued positively by the market due to implicit government subsidies. 
4. Empirical Results 
     Using panel unit root tests for our variables, we find that the dependent variable is I(1) and 
that in the RHS there is a mixture of I(1) and I(0) variables.  Also, panel co-integration tests 
strongly reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration.13  Therefore, in order to estimate the 
long-run coefficients we use the panel co-integrating estimator of Phillips and Moon (1999), 
i.e. the panel Fully Modified OLS (pFMOLS) estimator with crisis-varying coefficients.  
Hence, we allow for different slopes of the RHS variables in equation (9) that depend on the 
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  Results of the panel unit root and co-integration tests are in the Online Appendix. 
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regimes of the recent financial crisis, i.e. before-crisis (BC) period 2003:Q4-2007:Q2, during-
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where, PB is the market PB ratio, FPB the fundamental PB ratio as it estimated by 3DM, 
LEVERAGE is the leverage ratio, OPACITY is the variable measuring opacity and STLFSI is 
the market-stress index constructed by the Fed of St. Louis. 
Table 1: Long-run results 
Dependent variable: PB  
Model specification I II 
Co-integrating regressors Coefficients (standard errors) 
FPBBC 1.095* (0.096) 1.025* (0.087) 
FPBDC 0.769* (0.123) 0.765* (0.125) 
FPBAC 0.744* (0.085) 0.739* (0.083) 
H0: γBC = 1 (p-value in %) 32.6 77.9 
H0: γDC = 1 (p-value in %) 6 6 
H0: γAC = 1 (p-value in %) 0.3 0.2 
OPACITYBC 0.114 (0.664) 0.555 (0.513) 
OPACITYDC 1.039 (0.545) 0.988** (0.449) 
OPACITYAC -0.345 (0.447) -0.287 (0.389) 
LEVERAGEBC -0.008 (0.018) -0.019 (0.016) 
                                                          
14
  For the market-stress index, STLFSI, we also allow for one slope since according to Figure 1, this index 
reproduces precisely the crisis regimes.  As expected, results do not change.  Moreover, we also do not include 
STLFSI in the RHS and results still exhibit robustness.  All these results are in the Online Appendix. 
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LEVERAGEDC -0.003 (0.017) -0.006 (0.017) 
LEVERAGEAC 0.02 (0.017) 0.017 (0.017) 
STLFSIBC -0.217 (0.227) -0.381 (0.209) 
STLFSIDC -0.046 (0.065) 0.01 (0.062) 
STLFSIAC -0.216 (0.151) -0.241 (0.142) 
R2 / Adj. R2 (in %) 79.4 / 79.1 79.3 / 79 
Observations 803 867 
Notes: We use the panel Fully Modified OLS (pFMOLS) estimator of Phillips and Moon (1999) with 
homogeneous variance-covariance matrix.  We winsorize fundamental PB ratio, FPB, at 5th and 95th percentiles.  
The independent variable is the market PB ratio.  The fundamental PB ratio, FPB, is the long-run value of PB 
ratio given by the long-run steady-state relation of equation (7).  Model I is the model, where the fourth order 
moving average of R2 coefficient is used for proxy of opacity. Model II is the model, where the R2 coefficient is 
used for proxy of opacity (or the first order moving average).  We round to the third decimal.  * denotes 1% 
significance level and ** denotes 5% significance level. 
     Table 1 shows that the gamma coefficients of the fundamental PB ratio, FPB, before and 
during the crisis are equal to 1 at the 10% and 5% significance level, respectively.  Thus, 
controlling for leverage, opacity and market stress, we do not reject the hypothesis, H0: γ = 1, 
for these two aforementioned periods.  Regarding the after-crisis period, the null hypothesis 
is not rejected for significance level close to 1%.  Also, leverage, opacity and STLFSI are 
statistically insignificant at least at the 1% significance level.  So, the long-run values of 
fundamental PB ratio are properly calculated and 3DM seems to have priced risk, growth and 
cash flows effects, as they are proxied by cost of equity, expected growth of net income and 
modified dividend payout ratio, respectively, very well for all three regimes examined. 
     To test whether the financial crisis has altered investors’ attitude towards bank valuation 
in the short run, or alternatively, to check whether there are temporary deviations of market 
PB ratio from its fundamental value while controlling for other bank characteristics, we 
employ a restricted error-correction model (R-ECM) under a crisis-varying co-integration 
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framework.  It is a first-differenced equation augmented by the first lag of the error-
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where, PB is the market PB ratio, LEVERAGE is the leverage ratio, OPACITY is the opacity 
variable, SIZE is the log of assets, τ represents fixed time effects and ck individual BHC 
effects, and eit is the idiosyncratic error term.  ECT is the error-correction term constructed as 
the difference of FPB, i.e. the fundamental PB ratio as it estimated by 3DM, from PB, i.e. the 
market PB ratio.  Alternatively, it can be seen as the deviation of market PB ratios from the 
long-run equilibrium PB values.  Therefore we have    –  it it itECT PB FPB= .  Moreover, we 
allow for different slopes for the crisis regimes.16 
Results for Different Categories of BHCs 
     An interesting question is whether the GSIBs are systematically differently valued from 
the non-GSIBs in our sample, and second, whether market participants valued the BHCs that 
passed the stress test differently from the BHCs that failed these tests.  Put differently: does 
controlling for the GSIBs and the stress tests, i.e. SCAP in 2009:Q2 and the CCARs in 
                                                          
15
  We expect that the individual BHC effects are not jointly significant, because the FPB from 3DM in ECT 
includes the bank-specific intercepts.  We do not drop them out from the equation, as we did in the pFMOLS 
estimator, because they may be statistically significant along with the fixed time effects. 
16
  We did not include SIZE in the RHS for the long-run analysis since, at the steady state, there is no optimal 
size of a bank’s assets. 
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2012:Q1, 2013:Q1 and 2014:Q1, in equation (11) affect the results regarding the investors’ 
attitude towards bank valuation in the short run? 
     Morgan et al. (2014) study the SCAP and find that it had a positive effect on stock prices.  
Similarly, Candelon and Sy (2015) show that early stress testing (SCAP) had a positive 
impact on stressed BHCs’ returns, while the subsequent stress test (CCARs) effect decreased 
over time.  Furthermore, Flannery et al. (2017) based on “beyond standard event study” 
results support evidence that stress testing disclosures provide information to investors and 
market participants.  However, Neretina et al. (2014) find that the SCAP did not affect equity 
returns of the BHCs participating in this exercise, while the post-crisis stress tests seem to 
have barely affected equity returns.  Their effects are small and statistically weak.  In the 
same spirit, Glasserman and Tangirala (2016) suggest that the announcement of the stress test 
results did not inform the market. 
     The aforementioned papers rely on event-study techniques with daily data.17  We, on the 
other hand, have end-of-quarter data and we apply error-correction models augmented with 
impulse dummy variables for these events.  Given the fact that our data are at a quarterly 
frequency, our results should not be compared to those attained from event-study 
methodologies that use daily returns to detect market movements.  Instead, our results speak 
to the existence (or lack thereof) of lasting changes in market assessments in a period that 
includes the event in question: announcements of the stress tests.  In addition, our focus is not 
on the actual market moves but rather in the degree of divergence of market PB ratios from 
their fundamental value.  For example, if an event changes both fundamental and market PBs 
by the same amount, we will not see an effect of the stress-test dummy. 
                                                          
17
  Glasserman and Tangirala (2016) also use regression models with projected losses for the BHCs that 
participated in the stress tests. 
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     We include fixed time effects as well as the dummies for 2009:Q2, 2012:Q1, 2013:Q1 and 
2014:Q1, in our error-correction model of equation (11).  This may provide evidence of 
market reaction to these exercises conducted by the Fed.  Moreover, the dummy variables for 
SCAP and the successive CCAR exercises with the BHCs that failed these tests are intended 
to examine for evidence of market reaction captured in changes to the PB ratios. 
     Stress testing has become a systematic exercise conducted yearly by the Fed and it is well 
known that there could be limitations on the dividend policy of failed banks (see Panel B of 
Table 2).  Neretina et al. (2014) suggest that banks participating in these exercises become 
better at passing them, and Glasserman and Tangirala (2016) show that there is a trend 
towards greater predictability of the stress tests outcomes.  Also, Schuermann (2013) shows 
that BHCs are encouraged to mimic Fed’s stress-testing exercises to pass them, and Goldstein 
and Sapra (2014) suggest that BHCs adjust their portfolios to pass the stress tests.18 
Alternatively, these results suggest that investors can accurately forecast which banks will 
fail at the upcoming stress tests and thus, market participants may not be affected at all from 
the stress-testing public disclosures. 
Table 2: Comparison of key variables between BHCs 
Panel A: non-GSIBs / GSIBs     
Variables (median values) non-GSIBs / GSIBs 
Periods: 2011:Q4-2014:Q1 2012:Q1 2013:Q1 2014:Q1 
Market PB ratio 1.061/0.856 1.041/0.861 1.061/0.903 1.429/1.114 
Fundamental PB ratio 1.148/1.321 1.169/1.399 1.098/1.222 1.1/1.099 
Mod_DPR 1.104/1.043 0.983/0.858 1.186/1.177 1.455/1.209 
Exp_Growth 2.395/1.859 2.284/1.822 2.585/1.999 2.276/1.895 
                                                          
18
  On the other hand, Flannery et al. (2017) provide results, which show evidence that stress tests do not have 
impact on the formation of BHCs’ assets. 
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COE 9.439/10.703 8.854/9.514 9.465/10.744 9.439/11.621 
ROE 2.468/1.873 2.303/1.846 2.588/2.001 2.317/1.899 
ROA 0.249/0.174 0.234/0.209 0.26/0.202 0.258/0.178 
LEVERAGE 9.145/10.264 9.203/10.207 9.011/10.281 8.98/10.11 
OPACITY (I) 0.571/0.612 0.629/0.673 0.603/0.598 0.409/0.556 
OPACITY (II) 0.545/0.602 0.722/0.69 0.507/0.523 0.461/0.615 
Valuation -0.076/-0.352 -0.11/-0.385 -0.034/-0.261 0.3/0.014 
Panel B: pass / fail BHCs 
 
Variables (median values) pass / fail BHCs 
Periods: 2009:Q2 2012:Q1 2013:Q1 2014:Q1 
Market PB ratio 1.007/0.491 1.041/0.65 0.979/1.021 1.372/0.872 
Fundamental PB ratio 0.944/0.907 1.311/0.794 1.121/1.017 1.106/0.757 
Mod_DPR 0.292/0.079 1.122/0.017 1.181/1.016 1.477/0.164 
Exp_Growth 0.735/0.233 2.284/1.236 2.165/2.108 2.279/1.644 
COE 8.097/9.806 8.999/12.282 10.623/9.363 10.48/12.428 
ROE 0.737/0.234 2.303/1.238 2.206/2.125 2.313/1.647 
ROA 0.069/0.023 0.229/0.139 0.217/0.188 0.238/0.17 
LEVERAGE 12.257/11.473 9.674/10.713 9.81/10.822 9.581/9.731 
OPACITY (I) 0.376/0.383 0.629/0.673 0.603/0.611 0.485/0.475 
OPACITY (II) 0.456/0.422 0.711/0.731 0.517/0.491 0.491/0.494 
Valuation 0.067/-0.458 -0.206/-0.182 -0.127/0.04 0.24/0.153 
Notes: The Financial Stability Board (2011) published the list of the GSIBs for the first time in November 2011.  
Hence, we report statistics from 2011:Q4 in our sample.  Fundamental PB ratio is the long-run value of PB ratio 
given by the long-run steady-state relation of equation (7).  Mod_DPR is the modified dividend payout ratio of 
equation (5).  Exp_Growth is the expected growth of net income given by equation (6).  COE is the cost of 
equity given by equation (3).  ROE is the return on common equity (ROCE) given by equation (4).  ROA is the 
return on assets defined as the ratio of net income to common shareholders over total assets.  LEVERAGE is the 
leverage ratio defined as the ratio of total assets over book value of common equity.  OPACITY (I) is the opacity 
variable measured as the fourth order moving average of R2 coefficient of market-model regressions.  OPACITY 
(II) is the opacity variable measured as the R2 coefficient (or the first order moving average) of market-model 
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regressions.  Valuation is defined as the deviation of market PB ratio from its fundamental value over the long-
run PB ratio. Mod_DPR, Exp_Growth, COE, ROE and ROA are in percentages. 
     In Table 2, we observe that GSIBs experienced lower market PB ratios, dividend payout 
ratios, expected growth of net income, return on equity, return on assets and valuation 
indexes than non-GSIBs in our sample.  Also, they had greater leverage, cost of equity and 
fundamental PB values.19  Last but not least, regarding the long-run values of PB ratios, 
GSIBs had greater values than the non-GSIBs except for 2014:Q1, where they were equally 
valued with the non-GSIBs.  Regarding the opacity variables there were periods, where 
GSIBs were more opaque than non-GSIBs and vice versa. 
     Table 2 also provides information about the BHCs that passed or failed the exercises 
conducted by the Fed.  The BHCs, whose capital plans were not objected by the Fed, had 
greater fundamental PB values, dividend payout ratios, expected growth of net income, return 
on equity and return on assets than the BHCs that failed the corresponding stress tests.  
Regarding opacity, there is not a clear picture again.  Furthermore, failed BHCs had greater 
values for leverage (for 2009:Q2 it holds with means, 12.596 vs 13.544) and lower values for 
market PB ratios (for 2013:Q1 it holds with means, 1.21 vs 1.021).  Finally as we will show 
later, the BHCs that failed the stress-testing exercises, even though they had different bank 
characteristics, were not valued differently by the market. 
     Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (11) augmented by a dummy variable for 
the GSIBs in our sample according to Financial Stability Board (2013, 2014), an interaction 
dummy taking the value of one for the quarter when the 2009 SCAP took place but only for 
the BHCs that failed the 2009 SCAP, and three interaction dummies taking the value of one 
                                                          
19
  For the long-run PB ratios at 2014:Q1, GSIBs had greater average values (1.726 vs 1.423) than non-GSIBs. 
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for the quarter of the relevant stress test only for the BHCs, whose capital plans were 
objected at that particular test, i.e. the CCARs exercises of 2012, 2013 and 2014.20 
Table 3: Short-run effects (unrestricted slopes) 
Dependent variable: ΔPB 
Model Specification: I II 
Co-integrating regressors Coefficients (robust standard errors) 
C1 C2 C3 C4 
ΔOPACITYBC 0.508 (0.383) 0.511 (0.384) 0.038 (0.204) 0.039 (0.205) 
ΔOPACITYDC -0.537 (0.719) -0.541 (0.713) -0.225 (0.246) -0.213 (0.247) 
ΔOPACITYAC 0.181 (0.23) 0.158 (0.23) -0.041 (0.133) -0.048 (0.133) 
ΔLEVERAGEBC -0.07** (0.032) -0.07** (0.032) -0.13* (0.028) -0.13* (0.028) 
ΔLEVERAGEDC -0.056** (0.023) -0.059** (0.023) -0.057** (0.023) -0.06** (0.024) 
ΔLEVERAGEAC -0.08* (0.02) -0.08* (0.02) -0.078* (0.02) -0.078* (0.02) 
ΔSIZEBC 0.916** (0.377) 0.915** (0.377) 1.346* (0.423) 1.344* (0.424) 
ΔSIZEDC 0.627 (0.348) 0.657 (0.347) 0.658 (0.356) 0.689 (0.356) 
ΔSIZEAC 0.739** (0.26) 0.754* (0262) 0.729* (0.259) 0.747* (0.261) 
ΔSTLFSIBC -0.072 (0.298) -0.062 (0.298) -0.527 (0.337) -0.506** (0.336) 
ΔSTLFSIDC -0.034 (0.025) -0.034 (0.025) -0.051** (0.024) -0.051** (0.025) 
ΔSTLFSIAC 0.179** (0.057) 0.18 (0.058) 0.177* (0.059) 0.178* (0.06) 
ECTt-1, BC -0.12** (0.057) -0.119** (0.057) -0.123** (0.051) -0.122** (0.051) 
ECTt-1, DC -0.14* (0.052) -0.142* (0.052) -0.14* (0.048) -0.142* (0.048) 
ECTt-1, AC -0.093** (0.041) -0.092** (0.041) -0.092** (0.038) -0.09** (0.038) 
τ2009:Q2 0.316
* (0.082) 0.389* (0.085) 0.3* (0.083) 0.371* (0.086) 
τ2012:Q1 0.412
*
 (0.044) 0.413* (0.046) 0.421* (0.044) 0.419* (0.045) 
                                                          
20
  The BHC, Ally, which did not pass the DFAST 2013 is not publicly traded and thus, is not included in our 
sample.  The BHC, Zions, which did not pass the DFAST 2014 failed the CCAR 2014 and it is incorporated in 





 (0.043) 0.259* (0.046) 0.249* (0.041) 0.252* (0.044) 
τ2014:Q1 0.342
*
 (0.057) 0.348* (0.059) 0.344* (0.058) 0.346* (0.059) 
DSCAP-F – -0.198** (0.099) – -0.192 (0.1) 
DCCAR12-F – -0.002 (0.035) – -0.013 (0.039) 
DCCAR13-F – -0.064 (0.047) – -0.076 (0.048) 
DCCAR14-F – -0.066 (0.049) – -0.073 (0.055) 
DGSIB – 0.004 (0.027) – 0.016 (0.029) 
R2 (in %) 38 38.3 38.5 38.7 
H0: α’s (p-value in %) 0 0 0 0 
H0: β’s (p-value in %) 62.5 69.3 24.2 30.8 
H0: α’s & β’s (p-value in %) 0 0 0 0 
H0: gstress (p-value in %) – 15 – 12 








Observations 866 866 936 936 
Notes: We winsorize fundamental PB ratio, FPB, at 5th and 95th percentiles.  The independent variable is the 
first difference of market PB ratio.  Model I is the model, where the fourth order moving average of R2 
coefficient is used for proxy of opacity.  Model II is the model, where the R2 coefficient is used for proxy of 
opacity (or the first order moving average).  DSCAP-F, DCCAR12-F, DCCAR13-F, and DCCAR14-F are interaction dummies 
taking the value of one for the quarter of the relevant stress test only for the BHCs that failed that particular 
stress test.  The null hypothesis of α’s is the joint non-significance of the fixed time effects.  The null hypothesis 
of β’s is the joint non-significance of the individual BHC effects.  The null hypothesis of α’s & β’s is the joint 
non-significance of the fixed time effects and the individual intercepts.  The null hypothesis of gstress checks 
whether the dummy variable for the GSIB status, and the dummy variables of the BHCs that failed the SCAP 
and the CCAR exercises are jointly non-significant.  The null hypothesis of mktinfo checks the equality of the 
average value, G1, of the time dummies corresponding to SCAP and CCAR 2012, 2013 and 2014, and the 
average value, G2, of the rest time dummies against the alternative hypothesis that G1 is greater than G2.  The 
first row of mktinfo test contains the p-values of the t-tests incorporating the covariance effect, while the second 
row contains the p-values of the t-tests assuming a zero-covariance effect.  Both t-tests for mktinfo assume 
unequal variances and follow a student’s-t distribution with degrees of freedom given by the Welch-
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Satterthwaite equation.  We round to the third decimal.  * denotes 1% significance level and ** denotes 5% 
significance level. 
     In Table 3, we can see that leverage has a negative effect on investors’ beliefs regarding 
the PB ratio.  Higher leverage is associated with lower market PB ratios relative to 
fundamental values.  Regarding size, large banks enjoy higher market PB ratios relative to 
fundamentals.  Our results indicate that the market valued size positively before and after the 
crisis, and that this relationship disappeared temporarily during the crisis.  Our results are 
consistent with temporarily diminished expectations by investors that these large and 
systemic BHCs would benefit from government bailouts.  The regulatory actions to address 
the “Too Big to Fail” problems to financial stability seem not to have had a lasting effect.  
Moreover, we find that opacity does not affect market participants’ valuation at all 
throughout the period covered by our sample for the large and systemic U.S. BHCs. 
     The average speed of adjustment is around 11.8% in each of the four specifications (see 
columns C1 to C4 of Table 3), which means that a year (or 4 quarters) after a shock occurs, 
about 60.5% of any disequilibrium remains.  Time effects are jointly significant and, as 
anticipated, the individual BHC effects are jointly zero.  However, time effects and bank-
specific intercepts are highly significant when we test them jointly. 
     Testing whether the average effect of the four quarters corresponding to stress tests public 
disclosures is greater than the average effect of the other quarters, we find strong evidence in 
favor of the information value of the stress tests (see mktinfo tests in Tables 3 and 4).21  
Hence, similarly to Morgan et al. (2014), Candelon and Sy (2015), and Flannery et al. (2017), 
we find that the stress tests conducted by the Fed provided information to market participants.  
                                                          
21
  The mktinfo test tests whether the average value, G1, of the time dummies corresponding to the 2009 SCAP, 
and 2012, 2013 and 2014 CCARs exercises, is equal to the average value, G2, of the other time dummies.  The 
alternative hypothesis is that G1 is greater than G2. 
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In quarters that contained released results on these stress tests market participants revalued 
the BHCs participating in these exercises relative to fundamentals.  Also, our results are not 
in the same spirit as those of Neretina et al. (2014), who show within an event-study 
framework that post-crisis stress-testing had little impact on equity returns, or those of 
Glasserman and Tangirala (2016), who show that stress-testing public disclosures have 
become arguably less informative over time.  Of course, as we pointed out earlier, the time 
horizon of potential impact in our study is different since we have quarterly observations.   
     We move on to the question whether the market displayed any incremental, 
contemporaneous reaction for the BHCs that failed the stress tests.  We find that the market 
did not adjust differentially the valuation of BHCs, whose capital plans were objected by the 
Fed in the CCAR 2012, 2013 and 2014 exercises.  However, we find weak evidence in favor 
of incremental market adjustment in PB ratios of BHCs that failed the 2009 SCAP.  
Moreover, the null hypothesis of the joint non-significance of the dummy variable for the 
GSIB status, and the dummy variables of the BHCs that failed the SCAP and the CCAR 
exercises, is not rejected at any convenient significance level.  In other words, we did not 
detect divergences of market from fundamental valuation that was particular to the PB ratios 
of the GISBs or of the BHCs that failed the stress tests. 
     To check robustness, we impose a common slope across all three time periods delineated 
by the crisis for all explanatory variables.  The results do not change.  Table 4 presents the 
results with the restricted slopes. 
Table 4: Short-run effects (restricted slopes) 
Dependent variable: ΔPB  
Model Specification: I II 
Co-integrating regressors Coefficients (robust standard errors) 
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C1 C2 C3 C4 
ΔOPACITY
 
0.134 (0.254) 0.129 (0.254) -0.078 (0.112) -0.077 (0.112) 
ΔLEVERAGE
 
-0.063* (0.016) -0.064* (0.017) -0.08* (0.017) -0.082* (0.017) 
ΔSIZE
 
0.734* (0.222) 0.746* (0.222) 1.005* (0.257) 1.016* (0.257) 
ΔSTLFSI -0.047* (0.023) -0.047** (0.023) -0.05* (0.025) -0.05** (0.025) 
ECTt-1 -0.117** (0.046) -0.118** (0.047) -0.12* (0.043) -0.12* (0.043) 
τ2009:Q2 0.305
*
 (0.082) 0.376* (0.087) 0.277* (0.088) 0.357* (0.093) 
τ2012:Q1 0.406
*
 (0.048) 0.413* (0.049) 0.408* (0.049) 0.409* (0.051) 
τ2013:Q1 0.384
*
 (0.055) 0.395* (0.059) 0.382* (0.055) 0.388* (0.059) 
τ2014:Q1 0.285
*
 (0.05) 0.297* (0.051) 0.287* (0.053) 0.293* (0.055) 
DSCAP-F – -0.188** (0.095) – -0.211** (0.095) 
DCCAR12-F – -0.006 (0.031) –  -0.003 (0.036) 
DCCAR13-F – -0.059 (0.049) – -0.07 (0.05) 
DCCAR14-F – -0.058 (0.046) – -0.064 (0.049) 
DGSIB – -0.02 (0.028) – -0.002 (0.029) 
R2 (in %) 37.2 37.4 37 37.3 
H0: α’s (p-value in %) 0 0 0 0 
H0: β’s (p-value in %) 74.2 79.1 30.4 38.5 
H0: α’s & β’s (p-value in %) 0 0 0 0 
H0: gstress (p-value in %) – 17.5 – 9.6 








Observations 866 866 936 936 
Notes: We winsorize fundamental PB ratio, FPB, at 5th and 95th percentiles.  The independent variable is the 
first difference of market PB ratio.  Model I is the model, where the fourth order moving average of R2 
coefficient is used for proxy of opacity.  Model II is the model, where the R2 coefficient is used for proxy of 
opacity (or the first order moving average).  DSCAP-F, DCCAR12-F, DCCAR13-F, and DCCAR14-F are interaction dummies 
taking the value of one for the quarter of the relevant stress test only for the BHCs that failed that particular 
stress test.  The null hypothesis of α’s is the joint significance of the fixed time effects.  The null hypothesis of 
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β’s is the joint non-significance of the individual BHC effects.  The null hypothesis of α’s & β’s is the joint non-
significance of the fixed time effects and the individual intercepts.  The null hypothesis of gstress checks 
whether the dummy variable for the GSIB status, and the dummy variables of the BHCs that failed the SCAP 
and the CCAR exercises are jointly non-significant.  The null hypothesis of mktinfo checks the equality of the 
average value, G1, of the time dummies corresponding to SCAP and CCAR 2012, 2013 and 2014, and the 
average value, G2, of the rest time dummies against the alternative hypothesis that G1 is greater than G2.  The 
first row of mktinfo test contains the p-values of the t-tests incorporating the covariance effect, while the second 
row contains the p-values of the t-tests assuming a zero-covariance effect.  Both t-tests for mktinfo assume 
unequal variances and follow a student’s-t distribution with degrees of freedom given by the Welch-
Satterthwaite equation.  We round to the third decimal.  * denotes 1% significance level and ** denotes 5% 
significance level. 
     To sum up, a positive (negative) shock to fundamental valuation for these large and 
systemic BHCs leads to market under-valuation (over-valuation) as the market is slow to 
react to it.  Furthermore, market valuation relative to fundamental valuation is higher for 
larger BHCs, whereas the opposite holds for BHCs with higher leverage.  On the other hand, 
bank opacity does not seem to affect market participants’ valuations of PB ratios relative to 
their fundamentals.  Moreover, our results for the earlier (SCAP) and post-crisis stress-testing 
processes indicate that the market received valuable information that led to higher PB 
valuations.  On the other hand, we find strong evidence that the BHCs that failed in the 
CCARs were not valued differently by the market.  Regarding the 2009 SCAP, three out of 
four model specifications (see column C2 of Table 3, and columns C2 and C4 of Table 4) 
support that the BHCs that were in need to raise their capital were hit by market participants. 
5. Conclusions 
     The stock market valuation of large and systemic U.S. BHCs has a stable long-run 
relationship to three fundamental variables: the cost of equity, the expected growth of net 
income and the modified dividend payout ratio.  At any given point in time, however, there is 
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a large heterogeneity in the degree to which current price-to-book ratios of equity are 
temporarily above or below their long-run equilibrium valuation.  These divergences are 
created as market participants under-react to shocks in fundamentals.  Furthermore, they are 
rather persistent over time with a fraction of 12% to 30% of the gap closing each quarter.   
The degree of market under-reaction to shocks, and thus, of over- or under-valuation, is 
related to bank characteristics such as leverage and size but not to their opacity.  We provide 
evidence that the financial crisis has not altered investors’ attitudes towards bank 
characteristics.  In particular, before, during, and after the crisis, investors in large and 
systemic U.S. BHCs seemed to penalize leverage, albeit temporarily.  Before and after the 
crisis, they reward size in the short run but during the crisis this pattern disappeared.  We also 
show that opacity has no effect at all in our sample either in the short run or in the long run.  
Finally, we find that the whole stress-testing procedure has positively affected market PB 
ratios, while only the public disclosures of SCAP in 2009 seem to have negatively influenced 
market participants’ valuation of those BHCs that failed the test. 
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